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IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL: PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS FOR GLOBAL ANTITRUST IN A SYSTEM
OF NATIONAL LAWS
JENNIFER R. JOHNSON∗
I. INTRODUCTION
As business continues to expand on a multinational level, global
business organizations increasingly have a need for antitrust law that
transcends national borders.1 At the same time, States increasingly seek to
apply their domestic antitrust laws to any company whose practices affect
their domestic market, whether these companies are foreign or domestic.2
The issue that results from the combination of these factors, namely what
to do when both sets of law apply, has been the subject of much academic
debate.
The European Union and the United States are the two largest
economies in the world.3 As such, they provide an excellent model for
studying the conflicts that arise when two sets of laws apply to the same
activity, one set of laws domestically and one extraterritorially.
Unfortunately, the self-interest that motivates antitrust laws nationally
produces a global antitrust climate that is less than optimal and
discourages cooperation.4
Academics and policy makers alike have suggested several
possible models to ease these multinational tensions. However, each
∗

J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law, Spring 2003. The author would
like to thank George J. Alexander for his encouragement, support, and guidance.
1
See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 989, 991 (2002).
2
See id. at 1007.
3
See Krysztof Kuik, Recent Developments in EU/US Trade Relations, 79 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 433, 434 (2002).
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model fatally assumes an oversimplified picture of international antitrust,
proposing overly simplistic solutions. In addition, each fails to recognize
the role that emerging technology plays in the antitrust landscape.
This article presents the issues raised by the application of
domestic laws in an international context through the lens of the two world
antitrust superpowers, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union
(EU). Part II reviews the statutory basis for the antitrust laws in both the
United States and the European Union. Part III discusses the
extraterritorial application of domestic laws by the United States and the
European Union and the key differences between the two sets of laws. Part
IV illustrates the difficulties that arise when domestic laws intersect in a
global economy. Part V analyzes various proposed solutions to the world
antitrust problem, demonstrating their strengths and weaknesses. Finally,
Part VI proposes a new model that, while imperfect, solves several
problems presented by the previously proposed solutions, integrates
several aspects of those proposals, and considers the critical role of
innovation and new technology in the search for a solution.
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ANTITRUST LAW
A. U.S. Statutory Law
United States antitrust laws are comprised of a series of statutes
intended to promote free enterprise and fair competition by preventing
business activity that results in unreasonable restraints on competition
such as the formation of monopolies or certain unfair or undesirable
business practices.5 Several federal statutes cover antitrust issues including
4

See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U..L. REV. 1501,
1504 (1998).
5
See Stuart M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries
and Intellectual Property in the New Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2
(2002).
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the Sherman Act,6 the Clayton Act,7 the Robinson-Patnam Act,8 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act.9
Under the Sherman Act, Sections 1 and 2 are the most commonly
cited. Section 1 prohibits “contract[s], combination[s] . . . [and]
conspiracy[ies], in restraint of trade or commerce.”10 Section 2 prohibits
monopolies,

“attempt[s]

conspiracy[ies].”

11

to

monopolize,

or

combinat[ations]

or

Under the Clayton Act, Section 3 prohibits some

exclusive dealing agreements and refusal to deal agreements.12 Section 7
prohibits mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures tending to monopoly.13
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patnam act prohibits price discrimination
between purchasers.14 Finally, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations” from “unfair methods of competition” and
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”15 In addition, most states have

6

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Matthew Bender 2002). Congress added Section 6a to the
Sherman Act through the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, noting that
the Sherman Act would not apply to trade with foreign nations unless “such conduct has
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on internal U.S. trade or
commerce or U.S. exports to foreign nations giving rise to a claim under the Act. Id.
7

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27a.
See 15 U.S.C. § 13.
9
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
10
15 U.S.C. § 1. However, in United States v. Standard Oil, the Supreme Court limited
the literal reading to “unreasonable” restraints on trade for most categories under the
statute to avoid the potential problems due to the fact that the statute appears on its face
to prohibit all restraints of trade. See 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). This rule has been termed the
“rule of reason,” and is contrasted with the stricter standard used for certain categories of
clear antitrust violations, such as price fixing - “per se” – literally, as a matter of law. See
Bryan A. Garner, Ed., Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (Pocket Ed. West 1996). (See Case)
11
15 U.S.C. § 2.
12
See 15 U.S.C. § 14.
13
See id. at § 18.
14
See id.
15
See id. at § 45.
8
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enacted antitrust, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practice laws
that are largely consistent with the federal statutes.16
B. EU Statutory Law
The European Union is divided into three relevant institutions
dealing with antitrust regulation.17 The Treaty Establishing the European
Community (the EC Treaty)18 established the European Commission as
the executive branch of the Community, which proposes legislation and
monitors compliance.19 The EC Treaty also established the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), which consists of fifteen judges with jurisdiction
over such issues as failure to fulfill a treaty obligation and interpretations
of Community law.20 The third institution is the Court of First Instance
(CFI), which was created to ease the burden of the ECJ.21 The CFI is also
made up of fifteen judges, whose focus is upon more complex factual
situations.22
The majority of the antitrust law for the European Union can be
found in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty; treaty law rather than a
legislative or parliamentary action governs antitrust law in the European
Union.23 The goal of the EC Treaty is to promote agreements to strengthen

16

See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 3.
See Justin O’Dell, Note, Trouble Abroad: Microsoft’s Antitrust Problems Under the
Law of the European Union, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 119 (2001).
18
The EC Treaty is also known as the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty Establishing the
European Community (Treaty of Rome), Part Three Community Policies, Title VI
Common Rules on Compensation, Taxation, and Approximation of Laws, Chapter 1
Rules of Competition, Section 1 Rules Applying to Undertakings, Articles 81 (formerly
Article 85) and 82 (formerly Article 86) (1997)[hereinafter EC Treaty].
19
See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 119 (citing Scott M. Kareff, Terta Pak International SA
v. Commission: The European Approach to Monopoly Leveraging, 28 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 549, 564 (1997)).
20
See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 119 (citing Kareff, supra note 19, at 565-66).
21
See id. The ECJ is also the appellate court for the CFI. See id.
22
See id.
23
See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 120 (citing James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet:
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 352 (1996)).
17

Vol. 1 [2003]

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR GLOBAL ANTITRUST
Jennifer Johnson

122

the Community, thus arrangements that restrict Community commerce or
maintain economic boundaries between States are restricted or prohibited
by the EC Treaty.24 Article 81(1) prohibits all agreements between
undertakings25 that may affect trade between member States, and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market.26 Article 81(3) gives the
Commission the power to exempt individual agreements that may restrict
competition, but nonetheless serve other important goals of the European
Community.27 Thus, the two-step inquiry consists of an initial
determination of whether Article 81(1) applies, followed by an inquiry
into whether the activity nonetheless is exempted under Article 81(3).
Article 82 covers unilateral acts of dominant firms, prohibiting various
abuses of an undertaking’s dominant position if it has an indirect or direct,
actual or potential effect on trade in the relevant market or markets.28
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS
The United States and the European Union both seek to apply their
respective domestic antitrust laws to any company whose practices
“affect” their domestic market, whether that company is foreign or
24

See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 121.
The Treaty of Rome applies to all “undertakings,” Eurospeak for companies or
business entities. See MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 23 (4th ed. 1997).
26
See Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1992). See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81. The language
“effect on trade between member states” is defined broadly, requiring only a potential
effect on trade and allowing agreements between undertakings in the same member state
to fall under the purview of the Article if they affect competition. See Waller, supra note
26, at 59 n.21-22 and accompanying text.
27
See Waller, supra note 26. Parties to agreement can also seek a “negative clearance”
(formal binding decision that an agreement does not impinge Article 81) or a “comfort
letter” (informal non-legally-binding notification to ascertain the intentions of the
Commission). See id. at 61 n.36-38 and accompanying text.
28
See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 82. For a detailed description of the various
elements of Article 82, see O’Dell, supra note 17, at 121-28.
25
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domestic.29 When such application is to a foreign company, it is termed
“extraterritorial.”30 While a State’s extraterritorial application of its
domestic law is often a question of degree, some States are willing and
able to regulate conduct abroad and some are not.31
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws
The first time the United States considered the issue of
extraterritorial application of its laws was in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.,32 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. courts
had no jurisdiction because the actions at issue occurred abroad.33 More
specifically, although both the plaintiff and defendant in the case were
U.S. corporations, the actions at issue took place in Panama and Costa
Rica.34 Therefore, the Court declared that “the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.”35 However, the question of extraterritorial application
arose again in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),36 with
a different result. Under the holding of Alcoa, business enterprises with no
direct connection to the U.S., so long as they had an intended and actual
effect on the U.S. market, were subject to U.S. jurisdiction.37 This holding
came to be known as the “intended effects” doctrine. After Alcoa, the
United States could apply its laws extraterritorially, and was the only
country in a position to do so at the time.38

29

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1007.
See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1506. Likewise, “territoriality” is the situation in which a
country’s laws apply only to national activity. See id.
31
See id. at 1508.
32
213 U.S. 347 (1909). (See Case)
33
See id. at 358-59.
34
See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1506 (citing 213 U.S. at 356).
35
213 U.S. at 357.
36
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). (See Case)
37
See id. at 443-44.
38
See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1536.
30
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The Alcoa doctrine was revised in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America,39 wherein the intended effects analysis was transformed by
the court into the initial step in the consideration, to be followed by an
inquiry into international comity40 factors raised by the issue.41 A few
years later, the U.S. Congress also spoke on the propriety of the Alcoa test
by enacting the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Act, under which there must
be a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S.
commerce by the activity at issue to assert U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.42
Then in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,43 the U.S. Supreme Court
returned to the comity dialogue, affirming the principles of the 1982 Act.44
However, the Court also reexamined the Timberlane test, and held that
comity should only be considered when there is a “true conflict” between
foreign law and U.S. law.45 As a basis for this holding, the Court cited the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law premise that no conflict exists
when the laws of two nations can be complied with simultaneously.46 As a
result, the role of comity in U.S. antitrust law was reduced in favor of a

39

549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). (See Case)
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). “[Comity] is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” (See Case)
41
Specifically, the comity factors to consider include: (1) the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties; (3) the locations or
principal places of business of the corporations; (4) the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance; (5) the relative significance of effects
on the United States as compared to those elsewhere; (6) the extent to which there is
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; (7) the forseeability of such
effect; and (8) the relative importance of the violations charged of conduct within the
United States compared with conduct abroad. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15.
42
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (Matthew Bender 2002). See also supra note 6.
43
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
44
See id.
45
See id. at 798.
46
See id. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. e (1987)).
40
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stronger emphasis on the domestic antitrust interests of the United
States.47
B. Extraterritorial Application of EU Law
European Union competition laws regulate behavior that “may
affect trade” between member states or that has “an anticompetitive
effect” on the European Community market.48 This effect on trade must be
more than de minimus, and can be direct or indirect, actual or potential.49
Similar to U.S. law, comity concerns yield to enforcement of EU
competition laws.50 The European Union addressed the issue directly in
the “Wood Pulp” decision,51 in which a U.S-based wood pulp
manufacturer argued that because the association was legal in the United
States, it should be legal in the European Union as well.52 However, there
was no requirement in U.S. law that the company, because it was legal in
the United States., be exempt from EU law.53 The ECJ rejected the
defendant’s claims, reasoning that the principle of public non-interference
only applied when the duties of one State were in conflict with those of
another.54 The European Union further narrowed their consideration of
international comity in IBM v. EC Commission,55 holding that comity
should not even be considered until after a decision had been made.56

47

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1011.
See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81(1).
49
See id.
50
See generally Joseph P. Griffin, E.C. and the U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 353, 357 (1994).
51
See Case 89/85, In Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Commission, 1988
E.C.R. 5193.
52
See id.
53
See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1013.
54
See id. Note the similarity of this test to the American notion of the application of
principles of comity. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
55
See Case 60/81, IBM v. EC Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639.
56
See id.
48
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Later, in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas57 and GE-Honeywell58 cases, the
European Union made clear its intention to assert its jurisdiction to
companies outside of Europe.59
C. Key Differences Between U.S. and EU Antitrust Law
In many ways, European Community antitrust powers are lacking
compared to U.S. enforcement standards.60 Specifically, unlike the U.S.
Justice Department, the EC does not have the power to split up a company
that is violating antitrust laws, which may explain its heightened
stringency against potentially problematic mergers.61 The content of the
Sherman Act and EC Treaty is different as well. Unlike Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, EC Treaty Article 81(1) contains a partial list of prohibited
anticompetitive agreement types and reaches concerted conduct not rising
to the level of Sherman Act contract, combination, or conspiracy.62 Article
81(3) of the EC Treaty expressly permits the consideration of the kind of
health, safety, and societal concerns that the U.S. Supreme Court has held
to fall outside the scope of the rule of reason.63
In addition, the process under an EC Treaty Article 81 or 82
analysis is different from that under the Sherman Act. Specifically, under
57

See Commission Begins Investigation of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger,
Official Press Release of the Eur. Union IP/97/236 (Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, Belg.), Mar.
19, 1997, at 1.
58
See EU Commission Prohibits GE’s Acquisition of Honeywell (July 3, 2001),
available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001052.htm.
59
See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1015.
60
See Jeffrey M. Peterson, Comment, Unrest in the European Commission: The
Changing Landscape and Politics of International Mergers for United States Companies,
24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 377, 400 (2002).
61
See id. at 400 (citing Anita Raghavan & Brandon Mitchener, U.S. Executives Learn the
Hard Way About Mario Monti, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 2, 2000, at 1); see also Kuik,
supra note 3, at 442 (“Their traditionally higher willingness to actively pursue alleged
competition law violations is justified by the generally limited availability of effective
private enforcement.”).
62
See Waller supra note 26, at sect. II, comparing Cooperatieve Verenigning ‘Suiker
Unie’ UA v. Commission (SUGAR), 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1942 with Theatre Enters v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
63
See Waller supra note 26, at n.47 and accompanying text. See also supra note 10.
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U.S. law which standard applies and whether the conduct is in violation of
the statute are determined in a one-step process.64 However, under EU
laws, the Commission and the ECJ would not get to the issue of whether
an exemption should be allowed under Article 81(3) unless the agreement
was deemed anticompetitive under Article 81(1).65
As a result, certain anticompetitive agreements will pass unscathed
through EU antitrust law that the United States might consider per se
unreasonable.66 On the other hand, EC Treaty Article 81 provides for
much stricter treatment of vertical agreements compared to U.S. law.67
Therefore, European and U.S. antitrust law can come into conflict when
both sets of law apply, one domestically and one extraterritorially. The
key differences between the United States and the European Union in
practice concern application and practices and the extent to which antitrust
laws should protect competitors from competition.68 The issue of what to
do when both sets of law apply has been the subject of much academic
debate.
IV. NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

64

See Waller supra note 26, at n. 43-44 and accompanying text.
See id. at n. 45 and accompanying text.
66
See supra note 10.
67
See Waller, supra note 26. A further complication in the EU involves the fact that
individual Member States cannot agree on how much and what authority the EU should
have. See Peterson, supra note 60, at 408. Although some hope that the structure of the
United States could be reborn under the EU, this is unlikely because the EU is starting
from the “opposite direction.” See id. at 408-09 (explaining that the U.S. took settled
colonies and united them, but the EU is trying to start with separate countries and make
them cooperate).
68
See Address by William J. Kolansky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. and E.U. Competition Policy: Cartels,
Mergers, and Beyond (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.asdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.htm [hereinafter Kolansky Address].
Some have argued that sometimes competitors need to be protected not just for their own
sake, but for the preservation of competition. See id.
65
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A National Laws, Multinational Corporations
As businesses continue to expand into multinational corporations,
global business organizations increasingly have a need for global
antitrust.69 This result stems from the very problem that antitrust laws seek
to solve: antitrust policy is intended to restrain the behavior of
monopolistic firms to increase the welfare of consumers.70 Because firms
and consumers are distributed unequally across States, governments do not
have identical interests.71 Therefore, the United States and the European
Union have become, globally, the equivalent of the type of monopolies
that they try to prevent nationally. Under both sets of laws, if either the
United States or the European Union were corporations, they would
consider themselves an illegal monopoly.72 However, no global antitrust
authority exists to prevent either from unfairly using their dominant
position to increase their power. Further, being the historical world leaders
in antitrust law, they aren’t likely to want
to change their position.73
B. Current U.S.-EU Relations
The European Union and the United States are the two largest
economies in the world, jointly account for 50% of the world economy,
and share the world’s largest bilateral trading and investment
relationship.74 However, the growing interdependence in EU-U.S. trade
relations has not been met with equal cooperation.75 Despite this fact, they
have made steps to ease the tensions between the two sets of laws.

69

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 991.
See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1548.
71
See id.
72
In fact, the Treaty of Rome was meant to include “States” as well as “undertakings.”
See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81(1).
73
See generally Guzman, supra note 4, at 1507.
74
See Kuik, supra note 3, at 434.
75
See id. at 435.
70
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The United States and the European Union reached a regional
agreement in 1991, which aims “to overcome (1) conflicts between
competition authorities, (2) obstacles to information gathering in foreign
jurisdictions, and (3) differing rules under which firms must abide.”76 The
agreement

embodies

the

intention

to

make

the

nonbinding

recommendations by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)77 binding on relations between the United States
and the European Union; specifically, the recommendations of a negative
comity clause, a notification clause, and information exchange.78 Yet the
most “innovative feature” of the U.S.-EU agreement is a “positive comity”
clause that permits either jurisdiction to request that the other pursue a
particular case, and imposes a duty to make a good faith decision on
whether to pursue action.79 In addition, the joint merger working group
between the United States and the European Union is working to
“cooperate” and “bring us even closer together.”80

As globalization

increases and it becomes more difficult for any single antitrust authority to
enforce its antitrust laws without coordinated information sharing,

76

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1005 (citing Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S./EC
Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v. Microsoft
Corp. Window, 2 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 149, 159 (1996)).
77
The OECD is a multilateral organization that provide the basis for cooperative policies
between national agencies. See Handler et al., supra note 25, at [46] Recent OECD
recommendations include notification by one country when an antitrust enforcement
issue may affect important interests of that country or its nations and cooperative
consultation to minimize differences. See id. at [47] n.49 and accompanying text (citing
Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Between
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade,
OECD Doc. No. c(86)44 (Final) (May 21, 1986)).
78
See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1005 (citing Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding
the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-Eur. Comm., 30 I.L.M.
1491, 1491).
79
See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1006.
80
See Kolansky Address, supra note 68.
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agreements such as the informationsharing agreements between the United
States and the European Union are likely to increase.81
C. Extraterritoriality in Practice: The GE-Honeywell Case
In the GE-Honeywell case, the parties wanted to combine GE
(aircraft engine manufacturer) with Honeywell (avionics and other aircraft
components), arguing that the combined firm could offer a more
comprehensive range of products to customers. The United States
accepted this view and approved the merger,82 believing that lower prices
and an improved portfolio would benefit consumers.83
However, the European Union prohibited the transaction, fearing
that the new company would undermine its competitors by use of the same
advantages the United States applauded.84 As the result of the case, the
United States gained a strong reaffirmation by the European Commission
that it shares the ultimate goal of sound competition through focusing on
consumer welfare, which competition advances through lower prices,
higher output, and enhanced innovation.85
The agreement between the United States and the European Union
detailed above, although helpful to U.S.-EU relations, is merely an
information sharing agreement, and could not prevent the events that
transpired in the GE-Honeywellú case. This run-in between U.S. and EU
antitrust law serves as a stark example of a worldwide problem occurring
when domestic antitrust laws “overlap.” Academics, commentators, and

81

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 999.
From Reuters, GE Plans to Offer EC Facts in Merger, at B3, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(from Reuters)(May 29, 2001).
83
See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Evolving Architecture of International Law: The Global
Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway Regulation?, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 63 (2002).
84
See id. See also supra note 58.
85
See Kolansky Address, supra note 68.
82
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national agencies have suggested several possibilities to help ease these
multinational tensions.
V. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Commentators and policy makers have suggested several
possibilities to help ease the multinational tensions raised by the
extraterritorial application of domestic laws. As the following will
demonstrate, these suggestions represent widely divergent views the about
how to solve the problems currently associated with antitrust on a global
level. To date, no viable solution has emerged from the debate. In
addition, each model espouses an oversimplified view of the international
antitrust structure, and thus proposes overly simplistic solutions. Finally,
each of these models ignores one aspect of the current world antitrust
regime that is germane to the success of any proposal.
A. Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum
The European Community has proposed that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) house a global antitrust authority, whose goals would
include requiring member States to enact and maintain minimal
competition laws; mandating transparent, nondiscriminatory enforcement;
providing for cooperation between antitrust authorities; and aiming for the
gradual convergence of national practices.86 However, commentators
question the ability of the WTO to accomplish this goal for several
reasons.87 First, the WTO is a statutory and adjudicatory body designed
for negotiations and quasi-political-judicial proceedings between member
States, and is therefore not equipped to police private conduct by

86

See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1002 (citing Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in
Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 478 (2000)).
87
See id.
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organizations.88 Second, the fact-intensive case law that has evolved from
the antitrust statutes is more suited to interpretation by lawyers and judges,
as such specificity does not exist within the WTO regulations.89 Also, the
judicial procedures of the WTO are more suited for adjudicating issues
involving international norms than involving private corporations.90 In
addition to these difficulties, the WTO and other existing global agencies
are diplomatic in nature, focusing on advocating policies between States,
and are thus incompatible with the adjudicative role that would need to be
played by an international antitrust authority.91
Another problem with this model is that it assumes that States
possess equal power, but in actuality States have differing amounts of
leverage in the global market to impose their views of optimal antitrust on
others.92 For example, a State’s limited ability may result from a small
fraction of the foreign business taking place in that State, whereas an
unlimited regulatory ability may be the result of substantial assets and
large proportions of business in that State.93 In turn, this power disparity
produces different opinions about what constitutes optimal levels of
antitrust.94 Therefore, the only way that those with large amounts of
antitrust “bargaining power” would be willing to engage in an agreement
with those with less power is if those States compensate the more
powerful in some way for the loss they will suffer under the agreement.95
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See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (citing Tarullo, supra note 86, at 483-89).
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See id.
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See Sugden, supra note 1, at 996 (citing Guzman, supra note 4, at 1528-29).
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Unfortunately, the States that would need to make such payment are
unlikely to have the resources to do so.96
The European Community’s suggestion is that member States of
the WTO agree on a competition “code” that will be binding on those
States.97 Disagreement over what that code might contain aside, this
concept would likely fail to gain worldwide acceptance, based upon a
more well-known, lengthy, historical, and heretofore failed attempt to
subject all States to mandatory adjudication of issues – the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).98 In fact, one commentator called further efforts to
develop a global antitrust authority “a fruitless waste of time.”99 The
United States has also directly rejected this concept.100
Finally, agreements that address enforcement and require
minimum standards are likely to be difficult to negotiate or enforce.101
This is so because some States have difficulty enforcing their own laws, as
exemplified in the United States, due to antitrust enforcement through
private parties, states, and various federal agencies, as well as state
authority to create exceptions from federal compliance.102
96

See id. This is one reason that this commentator advocates the multi-subject negotiation
model. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
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See Peterson, supra note 60, at 406.
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The United States has been one of the few hold outs to the “World Court.” Ironically,
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(forthcoming 2003).
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See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1017.
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See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1541.
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B. Continued Bilateral Agreements and Strengthening Extraterritorial
Application
On the flip side, those who see an international antitrust authority
as an idealistic, albeit unrealistic, goal suggest measures more in keeping
with the current trend.103 One student commentator has suggested two
potential remedies: (1) continued development of bilateral agreements;
and (2) continued and strengthening extraterritorial application of
domestic antitrust laws.104 He cites the U.S.-EU resolution of the BoeingMcDonnell Douglas case as an example of why this system is likely to be
successful.105 In the case, a merger that the United States deemed to be
permissible was held to be against the antitrust interests of the European
Union.106 The United States and the European Union eventually found
terms that both could agree upon.107 Therefore, the premise of this
argument is that both U.S. and EU antitrust laws evolved as a result of
extraterritorial enforcement, causing the two sets of laws to converge.108
However, other commentators have questioned “whether the
existing model of . . . separate laws in each jurisdiction . . . [with] each
[jurisdiction] proceeding according to its own rules and agendas, subject
to coordination with other jurisdictions only at the margins – is viable.”109
In fact, some believe that following our current system to its logical
conclusion means that it is only a matter of time before the type of

procedures) and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (granting California right to
control its domestic industries even though doing so might affect interstate commerce)).
103
See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1017-20.
104
See id. at 1017-18.
105
See id. at 1018.
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See id. See also supra note 57.
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See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1018.
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See id. at 1019.
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See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 65.
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standoffs seen in the GE-Honeywell case110 are common in international
economic and diplomatic relations.111
In addition, the effect of any bilateral or multilateral agreements
needs to be considered, not just their likelihood.112 For example, an
agreement between two States, such as the United States and European
Union, is likely to occur because both entities are pursuing a similar policy
independently.113 For agreements between several States, the cooperation
is likely to favor the welfare of the negotiating parties, and this result may
not coincide with global welfare because only a small subset of the world
participates.114 In his discussion of positive comity, one commentator
noted that while enforcement authorities in such agreements are not
obligated to take action, they are expected “to investigate and make a good
faith enforcement decision on the basis of its competition law and not on
the basis of the nationality of the alleged victim or respondent.”115
However, other commentators have spent intensive amounts of energy on
methods that assume that this model is naïve. For example, one
commentator who focuses on the economic model starts with the
assumption that, due to national interests, States are unlikely to pursue the
most optimal level of global regulation.116
An example can be seen through the U.S. exemption for export
cartels. The U.S. Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918117 exempts from the reach
110

See supra note 58.
See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 66. The commentator that made this statement believes
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Markets?, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 230 (2000)(emphasis added).
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economic model.
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of the Sherman Act trade associations formed “for the sole purpose of
engaging in export trade.”118 The theory behind this exemption, from a
national perspective, is that as long as the welfare loss from
anticompetitive activities is largely or wholly borne by foreign consumers,
the optimal antitrust policy is no policy at all.119

These types of

exemptions allow exporters to engage in behavior that would be prohibited
if it occurred within the country.120
In short, this proposal suggests that we let the system work itself
out, largely continuing down the road we are currently taking. However,
William J. Kolansky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has stated that that division of
our government itself is against the idea of just ‘leaving things be’: “What
is needed therefore is not that we stop talking about these important issues,
but that we move beyond talking and begin taking steps to address
them.”121
C. The International Competition Network (ICN)
In October 2001, the antitrust authorities of thirteen States came
together to form the International Competition Network (ICN), which is
the only multilateral government organization to discuss “all competition,
all the time.”122 It is uniquely independent of other agendas pursued by
international organizations.123 As of Fall 2002, a total of fifty-six
authorities have joined.124 Premised on the understanding that “sound
118

See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1533 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 62).
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123
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antitrust enforcement requires a deep and shared ‘culture of competition,’”
the first step for the ICN is understanding each other’s law, institutions,
and economic principles.125 William Kolansky was recently quoted as
saying about the ICN:
“The goal of the ICN was twofold. First, to provide support
for new competition agencies both in enforcing their laws
and in building a strong competition culture in their
countries. Second, to promote greater convergence among
these authorities around sound competition principles by
working together and with stakeholders in the private
sector, to develop best practice recommendations for
antitrust enforcement and competition advocacy that could
then be implemented voluntarily by the member
agencies.”126
However, the world already has an agency to recommend
voluntary guidelines that States can choose to follow at their discretion.127
In addition, ineffectiveness resulting from the non-compulsory nature of
the early World Court can again serve as an example of why such a system
is unlikely to bring any significant change. The original Court was “an
international dispute resolution body, but it left arbitration by the Court a
voluntary matter, and left the U.S. Senate free to veto U.S. participation in
individual cases.”128 As history illustrates, recommendations are not likely
to be universally adopted if States are free to follow them or not as they
see fit.
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See Kolansky Address, supra note 68.
See DOJ Official Discusses ICN Before IBA Competition Conference, BNA Vol. 83,
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D. The Leadership Model
One commentator suggests that a new paradigm “leadership
model” may emerge out of the current global antitrust chaos.129 Such a
model would include the largest industrialized States attempting to adopt a
common enforcement approach and asking other jurisdictions to follow.130
However, he questions whether developing States will simply defer to the
rule of the most successful jurisdictions.131 By contrast, another
commentator suggests that developing States already defer to the most
successful jurisdictions.132 In addition, the problem of a small group of
States tending to their domestic economies rather than acting upon
recognition of globally optimal conditions discussed under the bilateral
agreement/extraterritorial application model applies here as well.133
E. The Expert Negotiation-Government Implementation Model
Recognizing that legal reform requires legislation, some have
acknowledged the success of experts working together to propose uniform
law instead of direct negotiations between governments.134 Looking to the
National Conference of Commissions of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
as its model, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is a clear example of
the success of this method on the national level.135 The NCCUSL is a nonprofit group formed in 1897 in response to the perceived need for uniform
state law approaches to U.S. commerce, and consisted of expert
commissioners, including private legal practitioners, law professors,
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judges, and legislators.136 This “expert negotiation-government adoption”
model could be translated to international antitrust issues.137
An example of this model currently in practice can be seen in the
joint merger working group between the United States and the European
Union.138 The group is comprised of twenty U.S. attorneys and
economists, and similar members from the European Union working
together to examine issues germane to antitrust law and discuss
cooperation.139 In addition, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, in conducting a thorough review of where they can improve,
convened a roundtable last November consisting of the senior in-house
counsel of various large U.S. companies for their input on how to improve
in the area of merger review.140
However, one commentator predicts that single-topic negotiations
are unlikely to lead to an agreement.141 He suggests that negotiations of
unrelated issues should take place simultaneous with those of antitrust
issues.142 Despite the fact that this makes negotiations more complex, it
also puts other issues “on the table,” allowing potential ‘losers’ in the
antitrust bargain other areas and benefits with which to bargain, making
agreement more likely.143
In addition, the successes of the U.C.C. and joint merger working
group may be lesser accomplishments than they appear. When the U.C.C.
was adopted, it was largely a revision of existing laws. The joint merger
working group, while discussing cooperation between the United States
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and the European Union, is working with the laws of two States with
roughly the same resources and the same goals. It would be naïve to think
that such cooperation could be as easily achieved between two (or more)
less similar States.
F. The Oversimplification Problem
One problem with each of the proposed solutions above is that they
assume an oversimplified international antitrust context. For example, the
global antitrust authority model assumes that States of varying levels of
antitrust enforcement, economic resources, and international clout will
drop their self-interest in favor of internationally optimal conditions.144
The bilateral agreement-extraterritorial application model takes this into
consideration, but therefore sees global cooperation in any form as
untenable.145 A viable solution lies somewhere between these two views.
The ICN model recognizes the problem of mandatory adjudication under
the global antitrust authority model, but its proposed alternative, voluntary
implementation,146 is likely to be just as ineffective. Likewise, the expert
negotiation-government implementation model recognizes that selfinterest may prevent governments from working together effectively, but
fails to recognize that States hold unequal bargaining power,147 and thus,
some countries may not have anything to bargain with. In addition, each
model fails to recognize the role of emerging technologies in the global
antitrust landscape, ignoring an important element of any viable
solution.148 In short, the issue of global antitrust regulation is complex, and
thus is unlikely to be solved by a simplistic model.
144
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VI. PROPOSAL
In considering a new model, one should not discard prior
incomplete ideas that have fractional utility. Instead, any new proposal
should take full advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of the models
that have come before it. To begin with, the model for building viable
global antitrust regime should begin with what appears to be most
successful – the expert negotiation-government implementation model.
This proposal, while imperfect, cures some of the deficiencies of its
predecessors, taking a step toward a truly workable international system.
As seen through the successes of the U.C.C. and the joint merger working
group of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division,149 this model begins
with a structure designed by those who are experts in their respective
fields. On the multinational level, this group would certainly include
participants from several different nationalities, but would not necessarily
include experts in international or comparative law. Instead, experts in
domestic antitrust law, economists, corporate attorneys, and those versed
in emerging technologies and intellectual property transactions would
better serve the purpose of designing a system for the future of global
commerce. A panel of experts in their respective fields solves two
problems raised by the Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum model. First,
experts can rely on their experience to include specificity in the norms and
standards that result from the group, an aspect lacking in previous
multinational regulations.150 Second, by including in the group those
involved in business and economics, the standards that result from the
group are more likely to be applicable to private companies in addition to
States, something that the global antitrust authority proposed by the
149
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European Community would not be able to do.151 In this way, the use of
experts as the core of this model brings it closer to the goal of international
cooperation.
In forming this group, cooperation will need to move beyond
bilateral agreements to the multilateral arena.152 Having said this,
however, a group with representatives from all States is unlikely to reach
any resolution efficiently. Therefore, the number of nationalities to include
must be somewhere between two (total) and one per member State. This
model proposes that a group of four to eight nationalities would be ideal.
This number is large enough to overcome the weaknesses of ineffective,
uncompromising bilateral agreements, yet small enough to find common
ground. In addition, a group this size is large enough and diverse enough
to include probable “leaders” for a large number of States. Therefore,
when States become part of the group, each can follow the model of the
founding State that is most similar to their own. This group will be
referred to as the “founding group.” A group of this size solves two
problems raised by the Bilateral Agreement model. First, it reduces the
number of standoffs that result from States’ attempts to proceed according
to their respective domestic laws and coordinating only when essential.153
Second, the group is small enough to be able to find some common
ground, yet large enough for that ground to be more internationally
optimal than if each country simply protected its own interests.154 Thus the
size of the group proposed by this model makes realistic international
cooperation more likely.
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Emerging technology may be the key to the success of this model,
as it often serves as an accurate predictor of where commerce is going.155
In addition, the inherent tension between intellectual property-imposed
‘monopolies’ and antitrust law requires that any new scheme consider
intellectual property issues if it is to achieve long-term success.156
However, the inclusion of technology also further complicates the
discussion. Nonetheless, the incidence and extent of Internet involvement
in business transactions have brought society to a point in history where
technology considerations cannot be ignored, regardless of how they
confuse the issue.
Once the founding group is formed, it could serve as the
“leadership” that other jurisdictions could eventually be asked to follow.157
To overcome the issues associated with forming an organization of the
most powerful jurisdictions and simply asking the rest to comply, the
member States of this group should vary in size and bargaining power.
Because the United States and the European Union are the “experts” in
antitrust thus far in global history, they should both be included.158
However, the remaining members of the group should include States with
less developed antitrust enforcement regimes and those with none
currently in place. This structure would open up dialogue addressing
respective concerns that the diverse groups have concerning their dealings
with the States with systems unlike their own.
States and corporations will not have models to follow without
initial government and corporate buy-in by those represented by the
founding group. Thus, the governments of the States that opt to be part of
155
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the founding group will need to commit to a sincere effort to adopt the
norms and standards that the group produces. Therefore, the
representatives of each State should understand the State’s domestic goals.
In addition, the group should include representatives from at least one
large corporation, or at a minimum, a State whose “economy” functions
much like a traditional corporation. In so doing, corporations as well as
States will have a model for smoother international relations. This
proposal envisions a system similar to that of the Good Housekeeping
Institute’s seal of approval.159 Moreover, when a State or corporation
adopts the norms and standards produced by the founding group, they
would be able to advertise as such, attracting others who support those
standards. At the very least, the founding group work product will be a set
of minimal standards that can assist States that currently have little or no
established antitrust law. This aspect of the model also solves the optional
compulsory tension implicit between earlier proposals.160 Since founding
group members will opt to be bound (compulsory), while non-founding
members can later join by following these models (a non-compulsory), the
group begins with a foundation that, if successful, is likely to expand.
Although it will introduce exponential complexity into the
bargaining, multi-topic negotiations should be the group’s goal. In so
doing, States with relatively little bargaining power in the antitrust area
may be able to cross-negotiate in exchange for concessions in an area in
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which they have more “clout.”161 One area to consider is emerging
technology. In addition to being indicative of future commerce, exchange
of assets is commonplace in the intellectual property context.
Crosslicenses are commonplace between corporations in competition with
each other, and can serve as a model for efficient exchange that enhances
and strengthens all participants. However, it is likely that the same States
that have antitrust bargaining power may have technology bargaining
power. The founding group should consider other areas of negotiation,
such as raw materials only available in States that lack technological
resources. This aspect of the model eliminates two barriers raised by the
Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum model. First, it reflects the reality
that States do not have equal bargaining power, and thus may not agree as
to what level of international antitrust cooperation is “optimal.”162 Second,
because States that have lower bargaining power in antitrust issues will be
able to leverage their potential in other areas, the resulting standards are
more likely to address their needs. Through this model, participating
States have the incentive of accruing national benefits in at least one
negotiated area while promoting global antitrust norms that are more
optimal internationally, thereby increasing the likelihood that such
negotiations will be successful.
While this proposal does not cure the myriad problems inherent in
earlier proposals, it takes some clear steps toward a realistic system by
eliminating some of the barriers thereto. Constructing an international
antitrust system out of a complex of competing national laws is a delicate
and exhaustive undertaking, as the shortcomings of former proposals, and
the limitations of this model illustrate.163 However, as this model has built
161
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on those provided by others; perhaps later models will also expand upon
it.
VII. CONCLUSION
As global business expands, so does the need for antitrust law that
transcends national borders.164 As a result, extraterritorial application of
domestic laws has come under increased scrutiny.165 The European Union
and the United States, the two largest economies in the world, provide an
excellent model for studying the effect of the conflicts that arise in such
contexts. Although many academics have proposed several models of
change, each model assumes an oversimplified problem and proposes an
oversimplified solution, as well as fails to recognize the role that emerging
technology plays in the antitrust landscape.
The new proposal takes advantage of the strengths and weaknesses
of the models that have come before it, combining the best aspects of the
expert negotiation-government implementation and leadership models,
and adding multi-topic negotiations and emerging technology to create a
small, but diverse founding group to serve as its foundation. While
imperfect, this structure is large enough to overcome the weaknesses of
ineffective, uncompromising bilateral agreements, yet small enough to
find a common ground and serve as the leadership that other jurisdictions
could eventually be asked to follow, mimicking the model of the founding
State that is most similar to their own. In addition, this model makes the
connection between theory and practice by advocating governmental and
corporate buy-in. By providing national incentives to all participants, this
model is a positive step toward achieving global cooperation.
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